University of Minnesota. Driven to Discover.
Gaps the GAO identified include instances of agencies overseeing their own labs, a need for more focus on the highest-risk activities, and understaffing.
Panel finds overall response was thorough, but notes policy gaps and some missteps after the samples were found.
DiEuliis D, Berger K, Gronvall G. Biosecurity implications for the synthesis of horsepox, an orthopoxvirus. Health Secur 2017 (published online Nov 1)
GAO. High-containment laboratories: coordinated actions needed to enhance the select agent program's oversight of hazardous pathogens. GAO-18-145. Oct 31, 2017
Layton DS, Choudhary A, Bean AGD. Breaking the chain of zoonoses through biosecurity in livestock. Vaccine 2017 (published online Aug 18)
Leger A, De Nardi M, Simons R, et al. Assessment of biosecurity and control measures to prevent incursion and to limit spread of emerging transboundary animal diseases in Europe: an expert survey. Vaccine 2017 Oct;35(44):5956-66
Millett P, Snyder-Beattie A. Existential risk and cost-effective biosecurity. Health Secur 2017 Aug 1;15(4)
Watson C, Watson M, Kirk Sell T. Federal funding for health security in FY2018. Health Security 2017 (published online Jun 27)
Get CIDRAP news and other free newsletters.
Sign up now»
Unrestricted financial support provided by
Become an underwriter»
CIDRAP - Center for Infectious Disease Research and PolicyAcademic Health Center, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN
© 2018 Regents of the University of Minnesota. All rights reserved.The University of Minnesota is an equal opportunity educator and employer.